Summarizing the document from the French Bureau of Investigation for Transport Accidents (BEA-TT), it emerges that this was the first run of the day (around 6:45 a.m. on November 19, 2024) for transporting workers, craftsmen, and equipment to the top of Cime Caron, where a construction site has been active for two years.
To avoid an in-line stop due to a probable malfunction during this first run and to ensure a reasonable travel time, the operator activated four drive mode selectors and engaged two overrides on the control panel. The system was therefore in manual mode, exceptional drive, overrides active, and “safety bypassed.”
The operator started the cable car and manually controlled the speed via the potentiometer, reaching 8 m/sec. The operator then heard a mechanical noise outside, near the cable car deflection sheave. He left the control room and went to investigate the noise while staying close to the control station. He did not return to the control panel and remained outside for 3 minutes and 16 seconds. When he heard the noise of cabin no. 1 jamming in the bottom station, he rushed back into the control room — it was 7:01 a.m. Since the potentiometer had remained set at 8 m/sec and the overrides were still active, only the station overspeed safety triggered an emergency stop and braked the cabins. The impact probably occurred at 6 m/sec.
The causes of the accident are therefore strictly human and organizational. The root cause is the generalized failure by SETAM’s technical staff to comply with regulations prohibiting the transport of people in manual mode at a “non-safe” nominal speed.
